January Research Roundup
Interesting Research we found in January covering Data Monetization, Decentralized Finance (DeFi), Cryptoeconomic Systems, Platform Cooperativism, and Transportation
|Ledgerback||Jan 26, 2020|
Hi everyone! Hope you are having a great start to the new year.
Here is a short and sweet roundup on interesting articles and projects we recently found covering Data Monetization, Decentralized Finance (DeFi), Cryptoeconomic Systems, Platform Cooperativism, and Transportation.
2019 DeFi Industry Annual Research Report
Author(s): Alec Fu, Cecilia Jiang, Harper Li, Johnson Xu
Alec Fu, Cecilia Jiang, Harper Li, Johnson Xu:
Area(s): Decentralized Finance, Lending, Collateral, Blockchain, Financial Services, Alternative Financing, Decentralized Exchanges, Trading, Derivatives, Securities, Interest, Governance, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations, Financial Organizations, Liquidity, Constant Product Markets, Cryptocurrrency, Ethereum, Decentralized Applications, DeFi Primitives, Money Legos
Total value locked in DeFi (at least).
MakerDao Dominance, accounted for about 50% in the ETH DeFi ecosystem.
The total value locked (USD) in ETH DeFi more than doubled in 2019, from $ 290 Million to $680 Million, despite recent declines in the cryptocurrency price.
DAI stablecoin saw the strongest market demand with only $3 Million locked in the DeFi protocol in the beginning of the year and grew exponentially to $30 Million at the peak.
Debt outstanding in USD more than doubled from $68 Million to $154 Million at the peak.
ETH supply locked in DeFi accounted for roughly 2.5% of the current circulating supply.
EOSs in circulation have been locked in the EOS DeFi ecosystem.
Lightning network saw a double growth in BTC value, from ~504 BTC to 1,100 BTC locked in the lightning network at the peak.
✅$2 Million/ $600 Million
The growth of DEX trading activities has been relatively slow but steady in the past year, the daily average trading volume across 2019 is ~ $2 Million compared to ~$600 million on a top tier centralised exchange.
✅DeFi lending will continue its pace in 2020 but will start to focus more on the integration of value added components, such as Oracle, DAOs, etc.
✅With the integration of liquidity aggregator and market making bot, DEXs will grow in a much faster pace in 2020, however centralised exchanges will still dominate the market.
✅Stablecoins will continue to grow and connecting the cryptocurrency industry and traditional fnance to bring a much wider adoption.
✅The DeFi industry will face some regulatory challenges, but proper DAO framework can help the DeFi projects to implement compliant governance mode
✅The industry should see an adoption of a pseudo-benchmark rate as the DeFi industry reference rate.
✅DeFi Financial instruments such as options, swaps will be created and gradually integrates with the existing DeFi infrastructure to help manage risks.
Introducing the Continuous Securities Offering Handbook
Author(s): Thibauld Favre and Joris Delanoue
CEO & Co-founder, Fairmint
COO & Co-founder, Fairmint
Area(s): Securities, Equity, Financing, Startups, Blockchain, Continuous Organizations, Token Bonding Curves, Cryptoeconomics, Securities Offerings, Continuous Funding, Funding.
A Continuous Securities Offering (CSO) is a new investment vehicle, updated for the digital era. The CSO enables companies with growth potential to raise funding by selling a claim on a reserve, funded primarily by a fixed portion of revenues. The CSO offers several advantages over traditional financing: Fairmint offers a turnkey solution that streamlines companies’ ability to launch and manage their own CSO. This document explains the market shortcomings that the CSO solves and provides an overview of how a CSO works, including the lifecycle and parameters for trading.
The Omnibus Model for Custody
Author(s): Ria Bhutoria
Publisher: Fidelity Digital Assets
Director of Research, Fidelity Digital Assets
Area(s): Custody, Digital Custody, Cryptocurrencies, Insituttional Investors, Cryptomarkets, Trusts, Custody Models, Securities, Digital Assets, Public Key Infrastructure, Proof of Custody, Liquidity, Derivatives, Key Management
How to Monetize & Tokenize Data
Author(s): Bruce Pon
Publisher: Ocean Protocol
Area(s): Data Monetization, Tokenization, Data Ownership, Token Economic Systems, Cryptoeconomics, Token Engineering, Data, Data Economy, Intellectual Property, Data Stewardship, Blockchain, Marketplace, Web3.0, Trust, Financialize, Frameworks
4 scenarios on how a platform cooperative breakthrough might happen in the 2020s
Author(s): Leo Sammallahti
Publisher: Coop Exchange
Area(s): Platform Cooperativism, Data Cooperatives, Ownership, Anti-trust, Cooperativism, Digital Cooperatives, Web3.0, Blockchain, Partnerships, Local-to-Global, Mutualization, Cooperative Alternatives, Cooperative Conversions
Economic Games as Estimators
Michael Zargham back at it again with the cryptoeconomic systems papers!
Author(s): Michael Zargham, Krzysztof Paruch, and Jamsheed Shorish
Publisher: Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics at WU Vienna
Michael Zargham, PhD:
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria
BlockScience, Inc, California, USA
Krzysztof Paruch, and Jamsheed Shorish:
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria
Area(s): Token Engineering, Complex Systems, Cryptoeconomic Systems, Decentralized Systems, Open Systems, Interdisciplinary Research, Economic Systems Engineering, Purpose-driven Tokens, Socioeconomic Networks, Peer-to-Peer, Collective Action, Blockchain, Systems Theory, Cryptoeconomic Protocols, Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Optimization, Signals, Rule Technology, Cooperative Games, Uncooperative Games, Complexity, Distributed Ledgers, Estimation, Dynamic Games
Discrete event games are discrete time dynamical systems whose state transitions are discrete events caused by actions taken by agents within the game. The agents’ objectives and associated decision rules need not be known to the game designer in order to impose structure on a game’s reachable states. Mechanism design for discrete event games is accomplished by declaring desirable invariant properties and restricting the state transition functions to conserve these properties at every point in time for all admissible actions and for all agents, using techniques familiar from state-feedback control theory. Building upon these connections to control theory, a framework is developed to equip these games with estimation properties of signals which are private to the agents playing the game. Token bonding curves are presented as discrete event games and numerical experiments are used to investigate their signal processing properties with a focus on input-output response dynamics.
Evaluating the Potential of Cooperative Ridesourcing: A Case Study of Arcade City in Austin, Texas
Team: Sara Stephens and Adam Stocker
Initiative: Project on the Energy and Environmental Implications of the Digital Economy
Housing Program Director, Sustainable Economies Law Center, California, USA
Consultant, Sustainable Economies Law Center, California, USA
Research & Project Management, Innovative Mobility group of UC Berkeley’s Transportation Sustainability Research Center (TSRC)
Areas: Ridesourcing, Transportation, Innovation, Cooperatives, Platform Cooperatives, Cooperativism, Blockchain, Protocol Cooperatives, Mobility Applications, Sharing Economy, Platform Economy, Transportation Cooperatives, Innovative Transportation, Case-studies
Should operators share their data with authorities?
Author: ALEXANDRE GAUQUELIN
Founder & Consultant, Shared-Micromobility
Areas: Smart Mobility, Micro-mobility, Shared Mobility, Data Governance, Local Governments, Transportation, Innovation, Data Stewardship, Data Monetization, Open Standards, Data Sharing, Compliance
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